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Abstract 
Objectives: Authoritarianism has a long history suggesting that it is primarily a phenomenon of 
the right.  However, I argue that this has led to scholars overlooking the potential that in some 
contexts, authoritarianism can lead to support for left-wing candidates.  African-American voters 
in the U.S. provide such a context. A key component of right-wing authoritarianism is that 
individuals will support whom they believe to be their rightful leader. In the U.S., who one 
believes to be their group’s rightful leader is contingent on the race of the voter and the party of 
the candidate. I hypothesize that as African-American voters’ level of authoritarianism increases, 
they will be more likely to support the left-wing Democratic candidate. 
Methods: I test this hypothesis with a national sample of voters after the 2012 U.S. presidential 
election. I estimate multiple logit models predicting the probability of voting for Obama. The key 
independent variables being respondents’ right-wing authoritarian score, their race, and the 
interaction of these two variables.  
Results: The results present strong support for my hypothesis that an increase in right-wing 
authoritarianism increases the probability of African-American votes choosing Obama.   
Conclusion: The results show that the effect of authoritarianism on vote choice is contingent on 
race/ethnicity. Too often scholars have overlooked the potential that whom individuals deem to 
be their established authority is contingent on the political context. These results challenge 
scholars to provide a more nuanced approach to how authoritarianism influences behavior. 
___________________________________________________________________
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 The concept of authoritarianism has generated a considerable amount of work over the 
last sixty years. Altemeyer (1981) is typically credited with developing the first modern 
psychological measurement techniques applied to the concept. One of the keys to Altemeyer’s 
definition of what he termed right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is that individuals are 
“relatively submissive to those they consider the established authorities” (2004, p. 426). This is 
an important yet often overlooked component of the authoritarian follower. As one would 
expect, given the name, work has shown RWA to lead to support for right-wing political parties 
and candidates (e.g., De Koster and Van der Wall 2007; De Witte and Billiet 1999; Leone et al. 
2014; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2002). However, this largely ignores the U.S. racial and political 
context. Decades of research, along with seminal works in the arts and humanities such as Ralph 
Ellison’s Invisible Man, have documented the differing experiences, treatment, socialization, and 
group identification of African-Americans (e.g., Boykin and Toms 1985; Cooper and Smalls 
2010; Kaiser and Wilkins 2010; Knuycky, Kleider, and Cavrak 2014; Monroe 2013; Tajfel and 
Turner 1986; Tatum 1997). I argue that it is highly unlikely that African-American voters view a 
wealthy, white, conservative, Republican (i.e., Mitt Romney) as their established authority. Thus, 
I propose the relatively novel hypothesis that as African-Americans’ RWA score increases, they 
will be more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. 
The work presented here builds on earlier research attempting to demonstrate the effect 
of authoritarianism on the choices individuals make in the voting booth, while controlling for the 
effect of the economy and partisanship, which is rarely ever done. I test the predictive value of 
the RWA scale with a national survey of voters after the 2012 U.S. presidential election. I find, 
first, that RWA is a significant predictor of voting during the 2012 elections. Second, contrary to 
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the received wisdom regarding RWA, African-American voters are more likely to support the 
Democratic candidate in the 2012 U.S. presidential election as their RWA score increases.   
Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
 Research on the authoritarian personality stretches back to the post WWII era.  It was 
largely motivated by a desire to understand how the Nazi Party was able to not only rise to 
prominence after the First World War, but come to dominate Germany with so many seemingly 
devoted followers (Adorno et al 1950). The ensuing decades of research have found that 
authoritarians tend to find themselves on the right side of the ideological spectrum (Hetherington 
and Weiler 2009; Meloen 1993; Stone 1980; Stone, Lederer, and Christie 1993; Todosijević and 
Enyedi 2008). Altemeyer’s (1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) works pushed the concept forward by 
eliminating many of the methodological problems associated with the original measures of the 
authoritarian personality. He also makes no pretense about where this measure tends to find its 
strongest adherents and simply calls it right-wing authoritarianism.  
Altemeyer altered the concept by moving away from the Freudian foundations of its first 
iterations and centered it as primarily a social psychological theory.  In doing so, he generated a 
scale that measures RWA.  This concept consists of three key components. First, individuals are 
highly submissive to those they perceive to be legitimate authorities.  Second, individuals evince 
a high degree of out-group aggression when it is sanctioned by the legitimate authorities.  Third, 
individuals express high levels of support for what they believe to be conventional or traditional 
values or behaviors.  
 The concept of RWA has spawned a considerable amount of work, the bulk of which has 
been focused on its effects on attitudes and beliefs rather than demonstrating its effect on 
behavior.  Some of the most prominent of these works are those demonstrating that scoring high 
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on the RWA scale leads to an increased likelihood of prejudice (Altemeyer 1998; McFarland, 
Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996; Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006; Raden 1999). However, the 
findings are certainly not limited to prejudice.  Individuals scoring high on the RWA scale are 
also more likely to favor the use of military force (Doty et al. 1997; Hetherington and Suhay 
2011), skew toward fundamentalist religious beliefs (Hunsberger 1995), and have less support 
for democratic values (Canetti-Nisim 2004) and universal human rights (McFarland and 
Mathews 2005). They are also lower in political knowledge and generally less interested in 
learning (Peterson, Duncan, and Pang 2002), although political experts appear to be better able to 
make the ideological connection between authoritarianism and conservatism (Federico, Fisher, 
and Deason 2011). In a particularly interesting study, Lavine et al. (1999) find that one’s level of 
authoritarianism moderates the influence of political messages. Individuals scoring high in 
authoritarianism respond more readily to threat messages, while those low in authoritarianism 
are more responsive to reward messages (see also Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005; Lavine et al. 
2002; Mirisola et al. 2014).   
 There have also been demonstrations of RWA’s effect on behavior.  Scoring higher on 
the RWA scale can lead to an increased likelihood of returning guilty verdicts (Narby, Cutler, 
and Moran 1993) and to have committed sexual assault (Walker, Rowe, and Quinsey 1993).  In 
their recent study of the effects of authoritarianism, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) find that 
scoring high in authoritarianism affects the likelihood of turning out to vote. In the 2000 and 
2004 elections, non-African-American Democrats scoring high in authoritarianism were less 
likely to turnout to vote, while high scoring Republicans were more likely to turnout. They also 
find the expected difference between the average authoritarianism scores for the Republican and 
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Democratic candidates, with the largest difference occurring in 2004 when Republican voters 
scored 14.5 percent higher than Kerry voters.  
 When it comes to voting in the 2012 presidential election, the obvious expectation is that 
the higher one scores on the RWA scale, the less likely the individual is to vote for the 
Democratic African-American candidate, i.e., Obama. However, within the RWA concept of the 
authoritarian follower is the subjective condition that the individual follows whom they perceive 
to be the rightful leader.  In its broadest conception, this means simply following the established 
power structure and suggests that the higher one scores on the RWA scale, the more likely one is 
to vote for the incumbent president. However, this would largely ignore the racial components of 
an election with an African-American president seeking reelection. I hypothesize that the effect 
of the RWA disposition is contingent on race/ethnicity. For white voters, as their score on the 
RWA scale goes up, they will be more likely to vote for Romney, while for African-American 
voters, as their RWA score goes up, the more likely they will be to vote for Obama.  
The supposition that African-Americans will be more likely to vote for Obama as their 
RWA score increases is a novel one. The idea here begins with the key component of RWA, as 
defined by Altemeyer (2004), that individuals are “relatively submissive to those they consider 
the established authorities” (p. 426). To date, research on the effects of authoritarianism in the 
U.S. has largely ignored the potential that the race/ethnicity of the candidates will cause different 
responses from voters, independent of the ideological content of the candidates’ messages. Thus, 
one might myopically predict that African-Americans scoring high on RWA will be more likely 
to support Romney. However, it is hard to justify why an African-American voter in 2012 would 
look to a wealthy, white, conservative, Republican as their established authority.  If submission 
to whom one perceives as their established authority has any meaning, it surely must vary 
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depending on the combination of who the individual voter is and the options he or she has in the 
voting booth. In the case of African-American voters in 2012, they have the option to support 
either a white, conservative Republican or an African-American, liberal, Democrat. Research on 
African-American group identity and voting behavior can help determine which candidate 
African-Americans will see as their established authority.  
Extant research indicates that African-Americans have a long history of conservative 
social values (Bolce 1992; Bolce and Gray 1979; Combs and Welch 1982; Kidd et al. 2007; 
Seltzer and Smith 1985; Watson 1998). Thus, the portions of the RWA scale tapping traditional 
or conservative values will capture these beliefs. However, whom African-Americans scoring 
higher on the RWA will be more likely to support is different than whom high scoring whites 
will support for two reasons. First, African-American voting behavior indicates a strong 
preference for Democratic candidates. Second, ceteris paribus, African-Americans respond to 
African-American candidates differently than they do to white candidates. This first claim is not 
controversial, however the second requires further elucidation.   
The importance of group identification has been the focus of study for decades (e.g., 
Miller et al. 1981; Tajfel 1981). Conover (1984) makes the important connection between group 
identification and politics by demonstrating how group identification leads to significant 
differences in how individuals evaluate the political world.  The most basic empirical realization 
of this has been demonstrated numerous times; i.e., as the population of African-Americans 
increases, the probability of an African-American being elected increases (Branton 2009; Canon 
1999; Guinier 1994; Lublin 1997). While the simple dyadic relationship between African-
American constituencies and African-American office holders has produced mixed results 
regarding its effect on African-American turnout (Gay 2001; Tate 2003; Griffin and Newman 
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2008; Philpot and Walton 2007), those taking a broader look at the effects of the political 
environment as a whole have found an increase in participation where there is significant 
African-American representation.  For example, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) demonstrate that 
African-American participation increases in areas with African-American mayors (see also 
Smith 1978). Rocha et al. (2010) demonstrate that African-American turnout increases in states 
with greater African-American representation in the state legislature. In addition, there are a 
large number of works that show how political trust among African-Americans increases with 
descriptive representation (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Howell and Fagan 1988; Tate 2003).  
In perhaps the most direct demonstration of African-American group identity and 
candidate support, Tate (2003) utilizes the 1996 National Black Election Study survey and shows 
that African-Americans believe that African-Americans represent their interests in Congress 
better than whites.  Sullivan and Arbuthnot (2009) echo these findings. However, they move 
beyond aggregate survey results and produce an experimental design to test this idea and find 
that African-Americans are more likely to support African-American than white candidates. 
Moving beyond the voting booth, Scherer and Curry (2010) also use an experimental design and 
find that greater descriptive representation in federal courts increases perceptions of the system’s 
legitimacy among African-Americans. All told, it appears reasonable to conclude from the 
research that, all else equal, African-Americans prefer African-American political representation. 
This is a general finding.  Here I argue that authoritarianism can intensify this desire for African-
American representation.  
Testable RWA Hypotheses 
  To summarize, I will test the following two RWA hypotheses: 
H1: As white voters’ RWA scores increase, the probability that they will vote for Obama 
will decrease. 
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H2: As African-American voters’ RWA scores increase, the probability that they will 
vote for Obama will increase.  
 
Data Methods 
 In order to explore the role of right-wing authoritarianism in driving vote choice during 
the 2012 presidential election, a national survey of voters was implemented from November 15th 
through the 19th. The survey was hosted and designed in Qualtrics’ online survey research suite. 
Sampling was done through Survey Sampling International’s (SSI) online sampling approach.1  
SSI was founded in 1977 and maintains 34 ongoing panels to form the core of its online sample.  
Knowing the potential problem with selection bias inherent in an opt-in online survey, SSI 
improves the quality of its sample by further recruiting participants from online communities, 
social networks, and websites of all types.  In doing so, SSI can potentially reach anyone online 
through their network of relationships with these online communities, websites, and social media 
groups.  SSI insures the representativeness of the sample and minimizes the risk of bias through 
a three-stage randomization process.  First, participants are randomly selected from SSI’s panels 
to be invited to take a survey, and these participants are combined with others entering SSI’s 
sampling platform after responding to online messaging (through invitations of all types, 
including e-mail, SMS, text, telephone, banner ads, and messaging on websites and online 
communities).  Second, a set of profiling questions (never affirmation questions) is randomly 
selected for them to answer. Third, upon completion, participants are matched with a survey they 
are likely to be able to take, using a further element of randomization.2 
****Table 1 about here**** 
                                                          
1 SSI has been used by scholars in many other works in the field (e.g., Esterling, Neblo, and Lazer 2011; Fahimi, 
Kulp, and Brick 2009; Malhotra and Margalit 2010; Popp and Rudolph 2011).  
2 Further information on SSI’s sampling process was provided to the author and is available upon request.  
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For this work, a sample of voters in the 2012 presidential election was selected.  
Wherever possible, the survey questions3 were direct copies of the wording used in American 
National Election Studies (ANES) surveys; e.g., all demographic questions (race/ethnicity, 
gender, age, income and educational attainment) and questions designed to measure party 
identification, ideology, and thoughts about the economy and political knowledge. See Table 1 
for coding rules for each variable. The RWA scale was adopted from Altemeyer (2004), which 
was chosen for two reasons. First, it has a long history and has been tested across numerous 
cultural and political contexts (Ahrens and Innes 1994; Rubinstein 2003; Duckitt and Fisher 
2003; McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Ekehammar et 
al. 2004). Second, one of primary criticisms of the RWA scale rests on the potential tautological 
reasoning that can occur when using it. That is, scholars have used the RWA to explain ideology 
in many contexts. The problem with this is that many of the very same elements go into 
measuring both RWA and ideology. Thus, these analyses are problematic. However, here I am 
attempting to explain vote choice, not ideology. In addition, I include a control variable for 
ideology in the models presented. Thus, there is little reason to suspect a circularity problem 
here.  
****Table 2 about here**** 
The RWA scale contains 30 questions. Each question is essentially a statement and the 
respondent is given a nine point scale to rate their agreement or disagreement with the particular 
statement. The scale is balanced so that half the questions would require the hypothetical high 
RWA person to answer “very strongly agree” and then answer “very strongly disagree” to the 
other half. Each scale is then coded so that the least socially dominant or authoritarian answer is 
                                                          
3 A copy of the full survey is available from the author upon request.  
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coded 1, while the most is coded 9.  Thus, the RWA scale ranges from a low of 30 to a high of 
270.4 Table 2 contains a list of each of the 30 RWA questions. The scale yields an average inter-
item correlation of 0.41 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.95. 
****Table 3 about here**** 
Table 3 shows the demographic breakdown of the sample of 1751 voters as compared to 
the Associated Press’ (AP) exit polling conducted in 350 places and comprising of 26,000 
Election Day voters. The survey I conducted through SSI is not a representative sample of the 
country. A quota system was used to match the sample to the distribution of the voting 
population along gender and race/ethnicity. Since the research conducted here is not attempting 
to estimate a population level statistic like the percent of people who voted for Romney, a 
representative sample is not necessary.  I am attempting to document an individual level effect, 
i.e., the effect of authoritarianism on voting.  The effects of psychological dispositions are 
documented using non-probability samples with regularity. Indeed, Altemeyer’s original work on 
RWA is not based on a representative sample of the Canadian population, but on a sample of 
convenience. In order for the survey I use here to be problematic, one would need to show that I 
am not controlling for a variable that is driving participation in the survey and both one’s level 
authoritarianism and one’s vote choice (Wooldridge 2013). I am unware of any such variable.  
As can be seen in Table 3, this sample appears to be a bit less wealthy and a little older, 
on average, than AP’s exit polling sample. I control for both age and income in the multiple 
regressions presented below, thus this fact is not driving the result.  All told, the survey’s 
                                                          
4 Coding the scores from 1 to 9 was done in order to maintain consistency with past work. In the regressions I 
subtract 30 from the scale so that the scales begin at 0.  This makes it easier to interpret the results of the 
interactions.  
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distribution appears to be broadly similar to that of the AP’s. The following regressions will rely 
on a subset (N=761) of the overall sample because respondents were randomly chosen to receive 
the RWA questions. As can be seen, there are some differences between the RWA subset and the 
overall sample, but they are broadly similar.  
Results 
****Table 4 about here**** 
 Table 4 presents results after estimating two logit models predicting voting for Obama in 
2012. The two models are the same except for the inclusion of the interaction between the 
variables African-American and RWA in Model 2. The interaction between these two variables 
is the key to testing hypotheses H1 and H2. Looking at Model 1, the RWA scale fails to reach 
significance. The other included variables perform as one would expect. Each of the race and 
ethnicity variables is highly significant. In this case, “white” is the dropped category and thus 
each of the coefficients on the remaining categories (African-American, Hispanic/Latino, and 
Other Race) is understood as compared to the dropped category. Therefore, the significant 
positive African-American result indicates that African-Americans are more likely to vote for 
Obama than whites.  
 Model 2 in Table 4 provides the test of each of the hypotheses.  As can be seen, once the 
interaction is included, neither RWA nor African-American reach significance, but the 
interaction does. With the interaction included in the model, the meaning of each of the other 
variables changes. In this case, the meaning of the coefficient on the RWA variable is the effect 
of RWA when African-American equals 0. Thus, this is the test of the hypothesis H1. Since it 
falls short of conventional levels of significance, it fails to provide support for H1. Looking at 
African-American, the meaning of this coefficient is the effect of African-American when RWA 
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equals 0. This would be the least authoritarian individuals and it is not too surprising to see that it 
also falls short of significance. The total effect of RWA for African-American voters is found 
with the combination of both the interaction variable and the African-American variable. First, 
the significant interaction indicates that the effect of RWA is conditional on one’s race. Second, 
a joint hypothesis test of the interaction and the African-American variables is significant 
indicating that the probability of African-Americans’ voting for Obama is conditional on their 
level of RWA.  
****Figure 1 about here**** 
 Interaction terms are notoriously difficult to interpret from simple output tables. 
Therefore, Figure 1 presents the marginal effect of RWA on white and African-American votes 
as one’s RWA score increases from 28 (10th percentile) to 164 (90th percentile), holding all other 
variables at their mean. The circle line represents African-American voters. At a score of 28, 
they have a .52 probability of voting for Obama. This jumps to .84 with an RWA score of 164. 
Of course, this .32 increase in the probability of voting for Obama is not the largest effect found 
in the model. As a comparison, moving from identifying as a Republican (score of 2 on the 
partisanship scale) to Democrat (score of -2) is associated with an increases of .58 in the 
probability of voting for Obama. However, in the case of sociotropic beliefs about the economy, 
RWA’s effect is quite a bit larger. Moving from thinking the economy is doing worse (score of -
1 on the sociotropic economy measure) to thinking it is doing better (score of 1) is associated 
with only a .12 increase in the probability of voting for Obama. Thus, the effect of RWA falls 
somewhere between two of the most commonly referenced voting variables, i.e., partisanship 
and the state of the economy.   
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Finally, the line with the “x” marking in Figure 1 represents the effect of RWA for white 
voters. As was evident from Table 4, the change for whites as RWA increases is not significant, 
although it does have the predicted slope. Figure 1 also makes it easy to see that the differing 
effects for whites and African-Americans begin at about a RWA score of 84, which is about the 
34th percentile score. Thus, there is not a statistically significant difference between whites’ and 
African-Americans’ probability of voting for Obama when one is low in right-wing 
authoritarianism.  All told, between Table 4 and Figure 1, there is strong evidence supporting 
hypothesis H2 in this data.  
Closer Look at RWA’s Multiple Dimensions and African-American and White Respondents 
 Duckitt and Bizumic (2013; see also Duckitt et al. 2010) have argued that the RWA scale 
consists of three distinct facets. They define them as follows: “Authoritarianism (defined as 
attitudes favoring strict, tough, harsh, punitive social control versus leniency and indulgent 
permissiveness to the violation of social rules, norms and laws), Conservatism (defined as 
attitudes favoring uncritical, respectful, obedient support for existing societal authorities and 
institutions versus critical, questioning, rebellious, oppositional attitudes to them), and 
Traditionalism (defined as attitudes favoring traditional, old fashioned, religious social norms, 
values, and morality versus modern, liberal, secular, bohemian, ‘alternative,’ norms, values, and 
morality)” (843). Thus, in the Duckitt and Bizumic conception Conservativism corresponds to 
authoritarian submission, Authoritarianism corresponds to authoritarian aggression, and 
Traditionalism simply represents traditionalism. 
Given the argument presented here that African-Americans find the Democratic 
candidate to be the proper authority, I would expect this to be primarily driven by the 
Conservative facet of the RWA scale. Unfortunately, Altemeyer’s RWA scale does not map 
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perfectly onto Duckitt and Bizumic’s newer tripartite scale. Given this limitation, I have coded 
the RWA questions (see Table 2) in order to approximate the three components of RWA. This 
produces extremely rough measures because the scales are not balanced and not all of 
Altemeyer’s questions could be clearly placed in one or the other category because they 
contained multiple of the facets in a single question. For example, the RWA question, “The only 
way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some 
tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas,” contains all three—
traditionalism, submission, and aggression.   
****Figure 2 about here**** 
The results of this exercise can be found in Figure 2.5 Part A of Figure 2 depicts change 
in the probability of voting for Obama as one’s Authoritarianism (i.e., authoritarian aggression) 
moves from 6 (10th percentile score) to 41 (90th percentile score) for African-American (solid 
line) and white (dashed line) voters. In both instances the 95 percent confidence intervals 
indicate that there is not a statistically significance relationship between this aspect of RWA and 
voting for Obama. In other words, functionally, both lines are flat. Part B measures the aspect of 
RWA that I have pointed to as being particularly important. As was the case with the results of 
the overall model in Figure 1, as African-Americans’ scores in the Conservatism (i.e., 
authoritarian submission) dimension of RWA increases, they are more likely to vote for Obama. 
The result for white voters fall just short of standard levels of significance. Finally, Part C 
depicts the results for RWA’s Traditionalism dimension. As was the case in Part B, as African-
Americans’ scores increase, the more likely they are to vote for Obama. However, unlike in Part 
                                                          
5 Full results for each model available upon request.  
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B, the effect is statistically significant for white voters too, but in the opposite direct. That is, as 
white voters’ scores in Traditionalism increase, they are less likely to vote for Obama.  
While keeping in mind the imprecision of these measures, the results are consistent with 
what I would expect to see if African-Americans do indeed find Democratic leaders to be the 
legitimate established authority. In addition, the Traditionalism aspect of RWA also shows a 
strong divide between how white and African-Americans respond to changes in their scores, 
whereas the authoritarian aggression dimension fails to reach significance in either case. These 
results clearly indicate that there is a more complex relationship occurring between RWA and 
political behavior in the U.S. than has heretofore been explored. The racial context alters the 
effect of authoritarianism on political participation. Ultimately, these results demonstrate the 
need for further scholarly investigation of this effect with more precise measures of each of the 
three dimensions of RWA.  
Discussion 
 Authoritarianism has been the subject of study for decades and has been linked to a wide 
variety of attitudes and behaviors. As scholars of voting behavior move forward and continue to 
refine our understanding of the choices people make in the voting booth, the results presented 
here indicate the need to incorporate psychological dispositions like the RWA scale. Importantly, 
the regressions control for the effects of both partisanship and the economy on presidential vote 
choice. When attempting to explain vote choice, failing to control for these two fundamental 
variables renders any results highly suspect. For example, failing to control for voters’ beliefs 
about the state of the economy in Model 2 of Table 4 would result in underestimating the effect 
of RWA on African-Americans’ votes by about 25 percent.6  
                                                          
6 This was determined by re-estimating Model 2 in Table 4 without the two economy variables.  
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The results also show that the effect of authoritarianism on vote choice is contingent on 
race/ethnicity. Too often scholars have overlooked the potential that whom individuals deem to 
be their established authority is contingent on the political context. High RWA scoring African-
Americans are not switching to the right-wing Republican candidate, but are more likely to 
support the left-wing Democratic candidate. This is a new finding and challenges scholars to 
provide a more nuanced approach to how authoritarianism influences behavior. Identifying who 
an individual believes to be the rightful leader is critical to understanding whom that individual 
is likely to follow. Heretofore, work has focused too much on matching abstract political 
ideologies and issue positions to authoritarian beliefs and disregarded the need for authoritarian 
followers to clearly identify with their chosen leader.  
 Of course, the results presented here are limited to the 2012 election.  One difficulty with 
this particular data is that it cannot parse how much of what is driving African-American voters 
is attributable to either their traditional support for the Democratic Party or the fact that the 
Democratic candidate was also an African-American. I suspect that this combination exacerbates 
the effect of RWA because it makes it easier for individuals to distinguish between the two 
candidates, thus, obviating the difference between low and highly knowledgeable voters. For 
example, the work of Federico, Fisher, and Deason (2011) has demonstrated that it is easier for 
those high in political knowledge to make the connection between attitude orientation and 
political candidate than for those low in political knowledge. Therefore it seems reasonable to 
suspect that any variable that can lessen the cognitive burden for those lower in political 
knowledge should make the effect of RWA more acute. 
 Finally, another line of work that would benefit from the inclusion of the RWA scale is 
that which is focused on the concept of incorrect voting (e.g., Dusso 2015; Lau and Redlawsk 
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1997, 2006; Lau, Andersen, Redlawsk 2008). This line of work suggests that voters often lack 
complete information about the policy positions of the candidates and as a result pick the wrong 
one (somewhere between 20-30 percent of voters by their estimates). Does right-wing 
authoritarianism lead voters to support candidates they otherwise would not?  Or perhaps those 
falling on either extreme of the RWA spectrum (and thus having more consistent attitudes) are 
able to better connect their attitudes to the correct candidate. The notion of incorrect voting 
deserves more attention and a psychological concept like RWA will help shed light on how and 
why individuals choose the wrong candidate.  
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Table 1 
Coding for Each Variable Included in Analysis 
Variable   Type   Description 
 
African-American Dummy  1 = African American, 0 = Not 
 
Hispanic/Latino Dummy  1 =Hispanic/Latino, 0 =Not 
 
Other Race  Dummy  1= Asian/Other, 0= Not 
 
Male   Dummy  1= Male, 0= Woman 
 
Ideological  7 Point Scale  -3 Strong Lib., -2 Lib., 1 Weak Lib., 0 independent,  
      1 Weak Con., 2 Con., 3 Strong Con.   
Pocketbook Econ. 5 Point Scale  -2 = Much Worse, -1=Worse, 0=Same, 1=Better,  
      2=Much Better 
Sociotropic Econ. 5 Point Scale  -2 = Much Worse, -1=Worse, 0=Same, 1=Better,  
      2=Much Better 
Education  7 Point Scale  0=Some High School, 1=High School Grad, 
2=Some College, 3= College Grad, 4=Some Post- 
Grad, 5=MA, 6=JD, PhD, MD, Prof. Degree 
Income  9 Point Scale  0=Less than $20,000, 1=20-29,999, 2=30-39,999, 
3=40-49,999, 4=50-59,999, 5=60-74,999, 6=75- 
99,999, 7 =100-149,999, 8=150,000 or more 
Age   6 Point Scale  0=18-24, 1=25-29, 2=30-39, 3=40-49, 4=50-64, 
5=65 and over 
Political Knowledge 9 Point Scale  Ranges from 0= Respondent answered all of the 
 political knowledge questions wrong, to 8 =  
Respondent answered all the questions correctly. 
Built from 8 standard ANES political knowledge 
 questions [(1) Maj. Party in Senate, (2) Maj. Party  
in House, (3) Which party more conservative, (4) 
Currently Unemployment Rate, (5) ID-Boehner, (6)  
ID-Biden, (7) ID-Roberts, (8) ID- Cameron] 
Partisanship  7 Point Scale  Standard 7 point partisanship scale: -3 Strong Dm,  
-2 Dem, -1 Lean Dem, 0 independent, 1 Lean Rep, 
 2 Rep, 3 Strong Rep.  
RWA scale  240 Point Scale Scale ranges from 30 to 270, based on 30 questions 
      Subtracted 30 so scale begins at 0 for regressions 
(0-240) 
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Table 2 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Questions 
 
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the 
radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. C 
2. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. T 
3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion 
than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s 
minds. C 
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit 
as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. C 
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas. 
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. T 
7. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
this upsets many people. C 
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our 
moral fiber and traditional beliefs. A 
9. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else. T 
10. The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. T 
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting for 
women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. C 
12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us 
back to our true path. A 
13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.” C 
14. God’s law about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is 
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. T 
15. It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines so that people 
could not get their hands on trashy and disgusting material. A 
16. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. T 
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell 
us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. C 
18. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. T 
19. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional 
family values.” C 
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just up and 
accept their group’s traditional place in society. T 
21. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. A 
22. People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old forms of religious guidance, 
and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. T 
23. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity. C 
24. It is better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let the 
government have the power to censor them. A 
27 
 
25. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to 
crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral 
standards and preserve law and order. A 
26. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which are not 
necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow. T 
27. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if 
they eliminated the troublemakers and go us back to our true path. A 
28. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly to the past. T 
29. It is wonderful that young people today have greater freedom to protest against things they 
don’t like, and to make their own “rules” to govern their behavior. C 
30. Once our government leaders give us the “go ahead,” it will be the duty of every patriotic 
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within. A 
 
Notes: Scale adopted from Altemeyer (2004).  Coding after each question to mimic Duckitt and Bizumic: C = 
Conservative, A = Authoritarian, T = Traditionalism.  
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Table 3  
Comparing the Demographic Distribution of the Survey Sample to AP’s Exit Poll 
 AP Exit 
Poll 
Survey 
Sample 
RWA 
Subset  
Gender     
   Male  47 48 49  
   Female  53 52 51  
     
Race/Ethnicity     
   White 72 73 76  
   African-American 13 15 12  
   Hispanic/Latino 10 8 8  
   Asian 3 3 3  
   Other 2 1 1  
     
Age     
   18-24 11 10 9  
   25-29 8 6 6  
   30-39 17 14 15  
   40-49 20 18 20  
   50-64 28 35 34  
   65 and over 16 17 17  
     
Income (in thousands of $)     
   Under 50 41 48 47  
   50-99.999 31 35 37  
   100 or more 28 16 16  
     
Education     
   No High School 3 2 3  
   High School Graduate 21 19 16  
   Some College/Assoc.Deg.  29 32 31  
   College Grad 29 29 32  
   Post Graduate  18 18 19  
 
Notes:  Each column represents the percent of total for each variable. 
Survey Sample N = 1751; RWA Subset N = 761 
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Table 4 
Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of Voting for Obama in 2012 
 
      Model 1  Model 2 
 
Key Variables 
RWA      -0.004   -0.005 
      (0.004)  (0.004) 
African-American     1.883*  -2.199 
      (0.886)  (1.446) 
RWA x African-American       0.040** 
         (0.014) 
Hispanic/Latino     0.918*   0.941* 
      (0.453)  (0.464) 
Other Race      2.396***   2.420*** 
      (0.577)  (0.613) 
 
Controls 
Male      -0.381   -0.425 
      (0.343)  (0.341) 
Education      0.051    0.056 
      (0.122)  (0.121) 
Income     -0.040   -0.042 
      (0.065)  (0.065) 
Age       0.293***   0.287** 
      (0.091)  (0.089) 
Ideology     -0.165   -0.153 
      (0.117)  (0.120) 
Partisanship     -1.056***  -1.073*** 
      (0.094)  (0.097) 
Political Knowledge    -0.293***  -0.307*** 
      (0.068)  (0.072) 
Pocketbook Economy     0.390    0.409 
      (0.265)  (0.276) 
Sociotropic Economy     0.741***   0.788*** 
      (0.158)  (0.144) 
 
Log pseudolikelihood    -164.27  -161.68 
Pseudo R2      0.68    0.69 
N       761    761 
 
Notes: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001, two-tailed. Regressions where run with cluster by state. Re-
estimating the models without cluster does not change the significance level of the variables.  
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Figure 1: Predicted Marginal Effect of RWA on the Probabilty of Voting for Obama 
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Figure 2: Predicted Marginal Effect of Duckitt and Bizumic’s Tripartite RWA Model 
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